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BRADY AND JAILHOUSE SNITCHES 
Paul C. Giannellit 
"The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch 
who claims another prisoner has corifessed to him. "1 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay is a byproduct of my work with the American Bar 
Association's Innocence Committee, which made a number of 
recommendations to prevent miscarriages of justice in the future? I 
was asked to write portions of a report on jailhouse snitches and 
became intrigued by their extensive use in some jurisdictions.3 More 
recently, I had the opportunity to read John Grisham's book, The 
Innocent Man, which tells the story of Ron Williamson.4 
t Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University. 
I Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1394 (1996). 
2 See REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION'S AD Hoc INNOCENCE 
COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRJMINAL PROCESS, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: 
FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUlL TY (Paul C. Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 
2006) [hereinafter INNOCENCE REPORT]. The Committee was tasked with undertaking a review 
of the causes for wrongful convictions and reconunending policies to better ensure that 
individuals will not be convicted of crimes they did not commit. Over a three-year period, the 
Committee drafted resolutions and accompanying reports that have now been adopted by the 
ABA House of Delegates. In addition to a resolution on jailhouse informants, the ABA adopted 
resolutions on false confessions, eyewitness identification procedures, forensic evidence, 
defense connsel practices, investigative policies and personnel, prosecution practices, systemic 
remedies, and compensation for the wrongfully convicted. These included recommendations for 
videotaping all interrogations, accrediting crime laboratories, conducting double-blind lineups, 
and requiring corroboration in all cases involving jailhouse snitches. 
3 See Symposium, The Cooperating Witness Conundrum: Is Justice Obtainable?, 23 
CARDOZO L. REv. 747 (2002). 
4 JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN 
(2006). 
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Williamson's capital murder conviction rested on the testimony of a 
jailhouse informant and hair evidence, often a lethal combination.5 
This was Grisham's first nonfiction work, and he explains why he 
wrote the book: "Not in my most creative moment could I conjure up 
a story as rich and as layered as Ron's."6 Indeed, Williamson's story 
is riveting but also tragic. Five days before his scheduled execution, a 
federal judge granted his petition for habeas relieC A jailhouse 
snitch, Terri Holland, was the key prosecution witness. She was 
awaiting trial for her third felony conviction8 when she purportedly 
heard Williamson's incriminatory remarks. 9 This was not Holland's 
first appearance as a jailhouse snitch; she also allegedly overheard 
incriminating statements in an unrelated murder case. 10 The 
Williamson case was also the focus of a chapter in Actual Innocence, 
a book by Jim Dwyer, Peter Neufeld, and Barry Scheele, which 
examined sixty-two of the first DNA exonerations secured through 
Cardozo Law School's Innocence Project. They wrote: "During her 
four-month bit in the county jail, ... Terri Holland had solved the 
two most heinous murders in the modem history of Ada, Oklahoma, 
by taking confessions from two complete strangers. "11 
5 ln Ron Williamson's habeas case, the federal district court correctly noted that the hair 
expert's testimony lacked scientific support; the court was "unsuccessful in its attempts to locate 
any indication that expert hair comparison testimony meets any of the requirements of 
Daubert." Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Old. 1995), ajf'd sub nom. 
Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508 (lOth Cir. 1997). The court further observed: "Although the 
hair expert may have followed procedures accepted in the community of hair experts, the human 
hair comparison results in this case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable." !d. 
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit reversed on this issue. Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 
1523 (I Oth Cir. 1997) (holding that the due process standard, not Daubert, applies in habeas 
proceedings). See also Paul C. Giannelli & Emmie West, Hair Comparison Evidence, 37 CRIM. 
L. BULL. 514 (2001) (discussing the DNA exoneration cases in which hair evidence was used to 
convict the innocent); Clive A. Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison 
Analysis: Nineteenth Centwy Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 COLVN!. HUM. RTS. 
L. REv. 227, 231 (1996) ("If the purveyors of this dubious science cannot do a better job of 
validating hair analysis than they have done so far, forensic hair comparison analysis should be 
excluded altogether from criminal trials."). 
6 GRISHAM, supra note 4, at 355. 
7 Williamson, 904 F. Supp. 1529. 
8 !d. at 1550 ("Another troubling aspect of this case concerns the motivation of one of the 
State's most important witnesses, Terri Holland. Holland's testimony provided the only 
evidence of straightforward admissions of guilt by Petitioner. ... According to her testimony, 
she had three felony convictions, one being a federal conviction for conspiracy to defraud the 
federal government, another for forgery, and the last for passing bogus checks."). 
9 !d. at 1551 ("Holland claims that during that incarceration she heard not only 
Petitioner's confession for the murder of Ms. Carter, but also Karl Allen Fontenot's confession 
for the murder of Donna Haraway.") (citations omitted). 
10 GRISHAM, supra note 4, at 152 ("The prosecution's star was the amazing Terri Holland. 
From October 1984 to January 1985, Holland had been locked up in the Pontotoc County jail for 
writing bad checks. As far as unsolved murders went in Oklahoma, it was a productive and 
remarkable four-month stay."). 
11 JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER 
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Moreover, Holland failed to mention Williamson's "admission" 
for over a year. 12 Incredibly, "Holland denied she ever received a.ny 
compensation or promises of leniency from the State in return for her 
testimony in either [murder case]."13 Another prisoner, Glen Gore, 
who also testified against Williamson, would later be proved the 
actual killer through DNA evidence. At the end of his opinion 
granting Williamson habeas relief, which was rendered before the 
exculpatory DNA tests were performed, Chief Judge Seay wrote: 
"God help us, if ever in this great country we turn our heads while 
people who have not had fair trials are executed. That almost 
happened in this case."14 
I. THE PROBLEM 
Of the sixty-two cases examined by the Innocence Project, twenty-
one percent involved snitches or informants. 15 According to the 
Center for Wrongful Convictions, snitch cases account for 45.9% of 
the 111 death row exonerations since the death penalty was restored 
in the 1970s.16 Of the 117 death penalty appeals pending in the 
California State Public Defender's office, seventeen involved 
testimony by in-custody informants and six by informants in 
constructive custody. 17 
Jailhouse infonnant testimony also played a pivotal role in the 
wrongful conviction of Guy Paul Morin in Canada: "Such testimony 
related to a purported confession to the murder, made by Mr. Morin 
to a fellow inmate at the jail, Robert Dan May. The confession was 
allegedly heard by a second inmate in an adjoining cell who also 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 135 (2000). 
12 Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1551 ("Holland testified that she did not inform the district 
attorney's office of Petitioner's alleged confession until February 1986, because she assumed 
that other personnel in the jail were already aware of his statements. However, no such reporting 
delay occurred in Mr. Fontenot's case, since she testified against him as early as his preliminary 
hearing in January 1985.") (citations omitted). 
13 Jd. 
14 Jd at 1577. 
15 DWYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 246. See also John M. Broder, Starting Over, 24 Years 
After a Wrongful Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2004, at Al4 ("Mr. Goldstein was able to 
establish conclusively that Mr. Fink, a habitual criminal, heroin addict and serial liar, had 
fabricated his account of Mr. Goldstein's 'confession' to him when they were together briefly in 
a Long Beach police holding pen."). 
16 CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM 3 (Northwestern 
University School of Law 2004) (most were jailliouse informants). 
17 Vesna JakSic, Calif. May Crack Down on Use of Jailhouse Informants, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 
1, 2007, at 6 (reporting that the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice 
issued guidelines on the use of jailliouse informants). 
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testified at the hial. " 18 Morin was later freed due to DNA testing; hair 
evidence also played a pivotal role in his case. 19 
Another Canadian case involved Thomas Sophonow. In addition to 
three jailhouse informants who testified for the prosecution, nine 
others volunteered. One was Terry Arnold, who is now a suspect in 
the killing. Of the testifying infmmants, Thomas Cheng had twenty-
six counts of fraud dismissed in exchange for his testimony. Adrian 
McQuade, a career informant, was the second witness. Upon his 
arrest as a material witness, McQuade threatened to commit petjury if 
not released. Records never disclosed to the defense revealed that 
while he offered to be placed in jail with Sophonow, he did not hear a 
confession. The Commissioner who investigated Sophonow's 
wrongful conviction described the third informant, Douglas Martin, 
as "a prime example of the convincing mendacity of jailhouse 
informants. He seems to have heard more confessions than many 
dedicated priests."20 With a record for petjury, he had testified as a 
jailhouse informant in at least nine cases.21 
Problems with jailhouse informants, however, predate the recent 
DNA exonerations. One of the most notorious examples involved 
Leslie Vernon White, who, on 60 Minutes, "admitted to consistently 
fabricating confessions of fellow inmates and offering perjured 
testimony to courts."22 White testified against at least a dozen 
inmates; in "one thirty-six day period, he gave evidence for the Los 
Angeles dishict attorney's office in three murder cases and one 
residential burglary-all arising from what he claimed were fleeting 
jailhouse encounters during which inmates revealed critical details 
about the crimes to him. "23 A grand jury investigating the matter 
18 Steven Skurka, A Canadian Perspective on the Role of Cooperators and Infonnants, 23 
CARDOZO L. REv. 759, 761 (2002). 
19 See HON. FRED KAUFMAN, THE COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS lNVOL VING GUY PAUL 
MoRIN (Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 1998) [hereinafter KAUFMAN REPORT), 
available at http://www.attomeygeneraljus.gov.on.ca!english/about/pubs/morin/ 
(Recommendation 2: "Tria! judges should undertake a more critical analysis of the admissibility 
of hair comparison evidence as circumstantial evidence of guilt."). 
20 MANITOBA JUSTICE, THE INQUIRY REGARDING THOMAS SOPHONOW (2001), available 
at http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/pubications/sophonow/jailhust/martin.html. 
21 Richard J. Wolson & Aaron M. London, The Structure, Operation, and Impact of 
Wrongful Conviction Inquires: The Sophonow Inquiry as an Example of the Canadian 
Experience, 52 DRAKEL. REv. 677,682 (2004). 
22 ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE 
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 65 (2002). "[White's] exploits were documented in a 1989 segment 
of 60 Minutes and resulted in a Los Angeles County grand jury investigation on the use of 
jailhouse informants." Id at 64. See also Robert Reinhold, Califomia Shaken Over an Informer, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1989, at AI ("Defense lawyers have compiled a list of 225 people 
convicted of murder and other felonies, some sentenced to death, in cases in which Mr. White 
and other jailhouse informers testified over the last lO years in Los Angeles County."). 
23 DWYER ET AL., supra note I I, at 128. In a different passage, they write: "Another 
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concluded that the Sheriff's Department "failed to establish adequate 
procedures to control improper placement of inmates with the 
foreseeable result that false claims of confessions or admissions 
would be made."24 Similarly, the District Attorney's Office "failed to 
fulfill the ethical responsibilities required of a public prosecutor by its 
deliberate and informed declination to take the action necessary to 
curtail the misuse of jail house informant testirnony."25 
Courts have also recognized this problem. A former prosecutor, 
Judge Trott of the Ninth Circuit, has commented: 
Never has it been more true than it is now that a criminal 
charged with a serious crime understands that a fast and easy 
way out of trouble with the law is not only to have the best 
lawyer money can buy or the court can appoint, but to cut a 
deal at someone else's expense and to purchase leniency from 
the government by offering testimony in return for immunity, 
or in return for reduced incarceration. 26 
The Supreme Court has made similar comments concerning 
accomplices, cautioning that "the evidence of such a witness ought to 
be received with suspicion, and with the very greatest care and 
caution, and ought not to be passed upon by the jury under the same 
mles governing other and apparently credible witnesses."27 Justice 
inmate, Sydney Stroch, was the 'Snitch Professor' who had supplied police with twenty 
'confessions' he claimed to have heard while locked up. He was a witness in court at least a 
half-dozen times." Jd at 129. 
24 REPORT OF THE 1989-90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY: INVESTIGATION OF ]AIL 
HOUSE INFORMANTS rN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM rN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 6 (June 26, 
1990). 
25 Jd. 
26 N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 2001). He elaborated: 
[B]ecause of the perverse and mercurial natnre of the devils with whom the criminal 
justice system has chosen to deal, each contract for testimony is fraught with the real 
peril that the proffered testimony will not be truthful, but simply factually contrived 
to "get" a target of sufficient interest to induce concessions from the government 
Defendants or suspects with nothing to sell sometimes embark on a methodical 
journey to manufacture evidence and to create something of value, setting up and 
betraying friends, relatives, and cellmates alike. Frequently, and because they are 
aware of the low value of their credibility, criminals will even go so far as to create 
corroboration for their lies by recruiting others into the plot, a circumstance we 
appear to confront in this case. 
I d. at 1124. Judge Trott had previously written on this subject. See Trott, supra note L 
27 Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909). See also Bennett L. Gershman, 
Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 829, 847 (2002) ("The cooperating 
witness is probably the most dangerous prosecution witness of all. No other witness has such an 
extraordinary incentive to lie. Furthermore, no other witness bas the capacity to manipulate, 
mislead, and deceive his investigative and prosecutorial handlers. For the prosecutor, the 
cooperating witness provides the most damaging evidence against a defendant, is capable of 
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Jackson put it this way a half-century ago: "The use of informers, 
accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any of the other betrayals 
which are 'dirty business' may raise senous questions of 
credibility."28 Yet, unlike jailhouse informants, statements of 
accomplices can often be corroborated with other evidence.29 
II. CREDIBILITY 
A jurisdiction could prohibit informant/accomplice testimony 
entirely. The Sophonow Commission in Canada came close to this 
position, recommending that "(a ]s a general rule, jailhouse informants 
should be prohibited from testifying."30 Alternatively, a jurisdiction 
could subject such testimony to an exclusionary rule, as Illinois 
presently does in capital cases involving jailhouse infonnants.31 If 
neither of these approaches is adopted, the decision regarding the 
reliability of this type of testimony is entrusted to the trier of fact, 
which cannot do its job unless it is fully informed of matters that 
affect the witness's credibility. 
Many of the Supreme Court's right of confrontation cases involved 
witnesses who have received or may receive benefits from the 
prosecution. For example, in Davis v. Alaska,32 the defense attempted 
to show that a key prosecution witness was a juvenile probationer and 
therefore had a motive-retention of his probationary status-to 
testify in a way favorable to the prosecution. The trial judge, based on 
a statute, excluded this evidence. The Supreme Court reversed: "The 
State's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile 
offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional 
right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse 
witness. "33 
lying convincingly, and typically is believed by the jury."). 
2B On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952). 
29 For a definition of jailhouse informant, see 725 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN.§ 5/115-2l(a) 
(West 2004) ("For the purposes of this Section, 'informant' means someone who is purporting 
to testify about admissions made to him or her by the accused while incarcerated in a penal 
institution contemporaneously."). 
30 Wolson & London, supra note 21, at 689. 
31 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/1 15-2l(d) (West 2004) (based ou REPORT OF THE 
GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Recommendation 52 (April 2002)). See also 
George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. 
REv. 1, 61--62 (2000). 
n 415 U.S. 308 (!974). 
33 Id at 320. Similarly, in Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), the Court wrote: 
"[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was 
prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a 
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness [questions about the dismissal of a criminal 
charge], and thereby 'to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately 
2007] BRADY AND JAILHOUSE SNITCHES 599 
III. BRADY 
Disclosure of impeachment evidence is constitutionally required 
under Brady v. Ma;ylancf 4-if it is material. In Giglio v. United 
States/5 the Supreme Court held: "When the 'reliability of a given 
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' 
nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this 
[Brady] rule."36 Indeed, the Court's most recent Brady case, Banks v. 
Dretke, 37 involved the failure to disclose that a prosecution witness 
was a paid informant. 
A. Materiality Requirement 
The Supreme Court undercut the effectiveness of the Brady rule 
when it began to create a stringent materiality requirement. The word 
"materiality" is a term of art in this context. It is not used in the same 
sense as in evidence law, where it simply means an issue of 
consequence under the substantive law.38 In the Brady context, it 
means "outcome determinative. "39 
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'" I d. at 680 (quoting Dmds, 415 U.S. at 
318). See also Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931) (defense counsel not permitted 
to question witness about present residence, which was under the control of federal authorities; 
"Prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and 
put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly 
appraise them. To say that prejudice can be established only by showing that the cross-
examination, if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tending to discredit the 
testimony in chief, is to deny a substantial right and withdraw one of the safeguards essential to 
a fair trial.") (citations omitted). 
34 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also Barbara Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an 
Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1982) (arguing that 
limiting the application of Brady is a natural evolution of and best serves the adversary system); 
Elizabeth N. Dewar, Note, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L.J. 1450 
(2006) (arguing that criminal defendants should be able to argue that failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence raises reasonable doubt); Robert Hochman, Note, Brady v. Maryland and 
the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1673 (1996) (arguing that Brady 
imposes duties not only on prosecutors but all state actors). 
35 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) ("[T]he Government's case depended almost entirely on 
Taliento 's testimony; without it there could have been no indictment and no evidence to carry 
the case to the jury. Taliento's credibility as a witness was therefore an important issue in the 
case, and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be 
relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it."). 
36 Id. at 154. 
37 540 U.S. 668, 703 (2004) ("[A]s to the suppression of Farr's informant status and its 
bearing on 'the reliability of the jury's verdict regarding punishment,' all three elements of a 
Brady claim are satisfied.") (citations omitted). 
38 See FED. R. Evm. 401. 
39 The suppressed evidence is material "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had 
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). See Bennett L. Gershman, 
Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 689-90 (2006) ("The most 
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The Court could have adopted a different approach. Instead of a 
demanding "materiality" standard, the Court could have used the 
traditional harmless error analysis.40 Dissenting in United States v. 
Bagley, 41 Justice Marshall advocated this position: "By adhering to 
the view ... that there is no constitutional duty to disclose evidence 
unless nondisclosure would have a certain impact on the trial 
[materiality]-the Court pennits prosecutors to withhold with 
impunity large amounts. of undeniably favorable evidence, and it 
imposes on prosecutors the burden to identify and disclose evidence 
pursuant to a pretrial standard that virtually defies definition. "42 
Under Justice Marshall's approach, the prosecution would be 
required to tum over all exculpatory evidence (whether or not 
material); if the prosecution failed in this obligation, the constitutional 
violation would be subject to harmless error analysis.43 Under this 
approach, the prosecution would have the burden of establishing 
hannless error beyond a reasonable doubt,44 rather than the defense 
attempting to demonstrate "materiality."45 The Court has adopted a 
similar approach to ineffective assistance claims, with the same 
disastrous effect. 46 
pernicious consequence of the judiciary's radical reconstruction of the concept of materiality 
has been to afford prosecutors an extraordinarily wide berth to conceal favorable evidence from 
the defense in the completely rational expectation that the suppression either will not be 
discovered or, if discovered, will be found by a reviewing court to not be material."). 
4° Once a reviewing court has found constitutional error, "there is no need for further 
harmless-error review." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,435 (1995). 
41 473 U.S. at 682. 
42 !d. at 700 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He further commented: 
Once the prosecutor suspects that certain information might have favorable 
implications for the defense, either because it is potentially exculpatory or relevant to 
credibility, I see no reason why he should not be required to disclose it. After all, 
favorable evidence indisputably enhances the truth-seeking process at trial. And it is 
the job of the defense, not the prosecution, to decide whether and in what way to use 
arguably favorable evidence. In addition, to require disclosure of all evidence that 
might reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant would have the 
precautionary effect of assuring that no information of potential consequence is 
mistakenly overlooked. By requiring full disclosure of favorable evidence in this 
way, courts could begin to assure that a possibly dispositive piece of information is 
not withheld from the trier of fact by a prosecutor who is torn between the two roles 
he must play. A clear rule of this kind, coupled with a presumption in favor of 
disclosure, also would facilitate the prosecutor's admittedly difficult task by 
removing a substantial amount of unguided discretion. 
!d. at 698. 
43 See United Slates v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 117-18 (1976) (Marshall & Brennan, J. J., 
dissenting). 
44 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (!967). 
45 See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.3 (2d ed. 1999). 
46 The "materiality" requirement in Brady functions much like the "prejudice" 
requirement in the ineffective assistance of counsel cases. See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 45, 
§ 27.6{d), at 947 ("An additional group of violations were destined not be analyzed under the 
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B. Prosecutor's Decision 
Another underappreciated aspect is the psychological posture in 
which the prosecutor finds herself when confronting Brady issues. 
Here, I believe the lack of trial experience by the members of the 
Supreme Court has had an impact. After law school, I tried cases in 
the Army-first as a prosecutor, then as defense counsel, and then 
once again as a prosecutor. I came to understand how legal rules 
worked in practice as well as the pressures generated by those rules. 
As a prosecutor, I could easily be righteous, seeing myself as the 
instrument of justice seeking redress for rape and homicide victims, 
and protecting the public from predators. Once a defense attorney, I 
changed my psychological mindset overnight. I could be equally 
righteous when I believed my client was innocent, but more typically, 
I would be disturbed because the prosecution had overcharged my 
client, or violated his rights in securing a confession, or made a deal 
with an accomplice who was far more culpable. In short, the abstract 
notion of the "adversary system" that I had studied in law school 
became a living, driving force in my professional life. With that 
understanding, lets look at the context in which Brady decisions are 
made. 
First, a prosecutor knows that she has a very high burden of 
persuasion-proof beyond a reasonable doubt-and, in most 
jurisdictions, must obtain a unanimous verdict from twelve jurors.47 
One juror holdout can "hang" a jury, and most defense counsel 
consider a hung jury, even though it will result in a mistrial and 
possible retrial, a victory. 48 
Second, the prosecutor knows she gets only one shot at a 
conviction. An acquittal will foreclose an appeal, due to the Supreme · 
Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence.49 In contrast, a conviction and 
reversal on appeal does not preclude a retrial. 5° 
Third, if the prosecutor believed the accused was i1mocent, 
virtually all prosecutors would dismiss the case. Thus, Brady issues 
arise in cases where the prosecutor believes the defendant is guilty. 
The Williamson case illustrates the power of this prosecutorial belief. 
Chapman's hannless error test because they were harmful by definition .... Examples include 
a fmding that counsel's representation was ineffective . . . or that nondisclosed exculpatory 
evidence was material .... "). 
47 See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 45, § 22.l(e) (discussing unanimity requirement). 
48 There are, of course, cases in which the evidence is overwhelming, but they tend to 
result in a plea bargain. 
49 See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 45, § 25.3(b) (discussing effects of acquittal). 
50 See id., § 25.4(a). 
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After Williamson succeeded in securing habeas relief, he sought 
DNA testing. Grisham writes: "Bill Peterson [the prosecutor] liked 
the idea of DNA testing. He had never wavered in his belief that 
Williamson was the killer, and now it could be proven with real 
science."51 Even after the DNA tests exonerated Williamson, the 
prosecutor's mind did not change. Grisham observes: "Peterson was 
still convinced Ron Williamson had raped and murdered Debbie 
Carter, and his evidence had not changed. Forget the DNA."52 With 
this mind set, the prosecutor must determine whether evidence is 
"favorable" and "materia1."53 In these circumstances, it is not difficult 
for the prosecutor to convince herself that evidence is "neutral" rather 
than "favorable" or not outcome determinative ("material"). 54 
Fourth, apparently prosecutors are not particularly good at 
assessing the credibility of their infonnants. The little empirical data 
on the subject indicate that there is often difficulty in screening out 
unreliable informant testimony. One prominent researcher 
commented: 
Surprisingly, however, professionals who regularly make 
these kinds of [truth-determination] judgments for a living, 
like the rest of us, are highly prone to error. In one study, 
researchers Paul Ekman and Maureen O'Sullivan were 
curious to know whether groups of so-called experts-such 
as police investigators; CIA, FBI, and military polygraph 
examiners; trial judges; psychiatrists; and U.S. Secret Service 
Agents-are truly better than the average person. Using 
stimulus materials from past studies-consisting of true and 
false stories-they found that college students had a 52.8 
percent accuracy rate, which is pretty typical. Police 
detectives were only slightly higher, at 55.8 percent; CIA, 
FBI, and military polygraph examiners were at 55.7 percent, 
trial judges were at 56.7 percent, and psychiatrists were at 
51 GRISHAM, supra note 4, at 288. 
52 !d. at 302. 
53 For a discussion of Brady issues involving scientific evidence, see Paul C. Giannelli, 
Criminal Discove1y, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REV. 79 I (!991). 
54 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he rule reinforces the natural 
tendency of the prosecutor to overlook evidence favorable to the defense, and creates an 
incentive for tbe prosecutor to resolve close questions of disclosure in favor of concealment."); 
Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 39!, 394-95 (1984) 
(arguing that since a prosecutor is "an understandably biased party," it is a "nearly impossible 
task" for a prosecutor to determine objectively what evidence is favorable to a defendant); 
Gershman, supra note 39, at 708 ("Moreover, for prosecutors, whose natural instincts are to 
discount any rule that would require tbern to assist a defendant in defeating the prosecutor's 
case, the Brady rule became an obstacle to be avoided or subverted."). 
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57.6 percent. U.S. Secret Service Agents won the prize, 
exhibiting a 64 percent accuracy rate, the highest of all 
groups.55 
603 
Fifth, the prosecutor knows that there is little chance that her 
decision will be revealed; neither the judge nor defense counsel will 
automatically review the prosecutor's decision. Every time I read a 
case involving a Brady issue, I want to know how the exculpatory 
information surfaced. How did the defense counsel learn of the 
evidence? Sometimes, a convict files a freedom of information act 
request. 56 Sometimes the information comes out after a request for 
DNA testing is made.57 At other times, the information is revealed in 
a related case. 58 I suspect it is rarely revealed by the original 
prosecutor, who has already found it non-material or non-exculpatory. 
In sum, Brady depends on the self-regulation of prosecutors. 
Finally, sanctions for Brady violations appear to be illusory. As 
one scholar, who has researched disciplinary actions against 
55 Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges af Truth, Deception, and Credibility: Confident But 
Erroneous, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809, 811 (2002). See also Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. 
Kassin, "He's guilty!": Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 LAW & HUM. 
BEHA v. 469, 470 (2002) ("Unfortunately, psychological research has generally failed to support 
the claim that individuals can attain high levels of performance in making judgments of truth 
and deception. Over the years, numerous studies have demonstrated that individuals perform at 
no better than chance level in detecting deception."); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with 
Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Tntth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 
917, 953 (1999) (reporting a study based on interviews with former Assistant U.S. Attorneys: 
"Four AUSAs expressed the belief that, due to a host of factors, most prosecutors are 'horrible' 
at the cooperation process and many, unwittingly, obtain false information."). See also 
Gershman, supra note 27, at 848-49 ("Some prosecutors trust their cooperators too much--one 
former prosecutor described the relationship as 'falling in love with your rat'-and this mindset 
skews the prosecutor's ability to evaluate the cooperator's credibility objectively."). 
56 United States v. Stifel, 594 F. Supp. 1525, 1543 (N.D. Ohio 1984) ("[H]ad the defense 
known of the November 1968 tests performed by [the expert] on tape obtained from Plymouth 
Rubber Company, it could have used this evidence to further impeach the credibility of [the 
expert's] scientific methods."). 
57 See DWYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 125 ("Fish's misleading testimony in the Willis 
case, which led to the conviction of an innocent man and allowed a predator to continue 
roaming the streets, shows why the state should have turned over all of Fish's laboratory notes 
and data, rather than merely presenting her final report"); Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, 
Editorial, Junk Science, Junk Evidence, N.Y. TIMES; May 11, 2001, at A31 ("In Chicago, a 
police lab analyst, Pamela Fish, left out exculpatory serological results in testimony at a 1992 
rape trial, contributing to a wrongful conviction. In 1999, the defendant was exonerated by DNA 
tests. Questions have now been raised about Ms. Fish's conduct in a 1986 murder case."). 
58 See Troedel v. Wainwright, 667 F. Supp. 1456, 1459-60 (S.D. Fla. 1986) ("In light of 
this admission, the above testimony received at the evidentiary hearing and the inconsistent 
positions taken by the prosecution at Hawkins' and Troedel's trials, respectively, the Court 
concludes that the opinion Troedel had fired the weapon was known by the prosecution not to 
be based on the results of the neutron activation analysis tests, or on any scientific certainty or 
even probability. Thus, the subject testimony was not only misleading, but also was used by the 
State knowing it to be misleading."), aff'd sub nom. Troedel v. Dugger, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 
1987). 
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prosecutors, noted: "When it comes to disciplining a prosecutor who 
commits Brady-type misconduct, . . . punishment is virtually 
nonexistent. "59 
Given these realities, some stemming from the prosecution's 
difficult burdens in obtaining convictions, and some peculiar to the 
Brady doctrine, we should not be surprised with the present state of 
affairs.60 
IV. DISCOVERY PROVISIONS 
Although many scrupulous prosecutors adhere to the Brady 
requirements, others have failed, and failed far too often. A better 
approach is expanded discovery rules. Here, again, my experience 
trying courts-mmiial cases has influenced my thinking. The military 
system went beyond an "open file" system. The same case file was 
given to both the prosecutor and defense attorney-and usually at the 
same time. Moreover, defense attorneys had the right to interview all 
prosecution witnesses who served in the Armed Forces.61 As far as I 
could tell, there were few Brady issues. 
The Model Code places an ethical duty on prosecutors to disclose 
favorable defense evidence. 62 Current ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards require the prosecution to disclose cooperation 
59 Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A 
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 742 (1987). See also Greshman, supra note 39, at 687 
("Brady is insufficiently enforced when violations are discovered, and virtually unenforceable 
when violations are hidden."); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial 
Misconduct and Wrong/ill Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. 
REV. 399, 400 ("[P]rosecutorial misconduct is largely the result of three institutional conditions: 
vague ethics rules that provide ambiguous guidance to prosecutors; vast discretionary authority 
with little or no transparency; and inadequate remedies for prosecutorial misconduct, which 
create perverse incentives for prosecutors to engage in, rather than refrain from, prosecutorial 
misconduct."); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of 
the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 934 
(1997) ("We should not continue to permit the almost total lack of meaningful sanctions to 
enforce the command of Brady to constitute our own sanction for the misconduct of our 
prosecutors."); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrong/ill Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution 
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 275,281-82 (2004). 
60 Gershman, supra note 39, at 686 ("Reflecting on this landmark decision forty-three 
years later, one is struck by the dissonance between Brady's grand expectations to civilize U.S. 
criminal justice and the grim reality of its largely unfulfilled promise."). 
61 There were typically no barriers to interviewing witnesses. I would simply telephone 
the witness's commanding officer and set up a time for an interview. Of course, witnesses had 
the right not to incriminate themselves, and if a witness was charged with a crime, the right to 
counsel. 
62 MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (governing the special responsibilities of a 
prosecutor and requiring a prosecutor to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence 
or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates 
the offense .... "). 
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agreements,63 as well as exculpatory evidence,64 before trial. Some 
states have comparable provisions.65 These rules are not enough. 
One court devised special rules for jailhouse informants. In Dodd 
v. State,66 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, after noting that 
"[ c ]ourts should be exceedingly leery of jailhouse informants, 
especially if there is a hint that the informant received some sm1 of a 
benefit for his or her testimony,"67 went on to adopt special discovery 
rules in this context: 
At least ten days before trial, the state is required to disclose 
in discovery: (1) the complete criminal history of the 
informant; (2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that 
the offering party has made or may make in the future to the 
informant; (3) the specific statements made by the defendant 
and the time, place, and manner of their disclosure; (4) all 
other cases in which the informant testified or offered 
statements against an individual but was not called, whether 
the statements were admitted in the case, and whether the 
infonnant received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit 
in exchange for or subsequent to that testimony or statement; 
( 5) whether at any time the informant recanted that testimony 
or statement, and if so, a transcript or copy of such 
recantation; and (6) any other information relevant to the 
informant's credibility .68 
This is a remarkable decision. It came from the same state where 
Williamson was convicted. The Canadian ("Kaufinan") Commission 
in the Guy Paul Morin case also recommended extensive disclosure in 
the informant context, 69 and Illinois subsequently codified this 
63 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY ll-
2.l(a)(iii) (3d ed. 1996) ("The relationship, if any, between the prosecution and any witness it 
intends to call at trial, including the nature and circumstances of any agreement, understanding 
or representation between the prosecution and the witness that constitutes an inducement for the 
cooperation or testimony of the witness."). 
64 /d., Standard II-2.1(a)(viii). 
65 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 45, § 20.3(m), at 884. 
66 993 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000). 
67 /d. at 783. 
68 Id. at 784. 
69 KAUFMAN REPORT, supra note 19, Reco=endation No. 47 [Prosecutors ought to 
disclose]: 
(1) The criminal record of the in-custody informer including, where accessible to 
the police or Crown, the synopses relating to any convictions. 
(2) Any information in the prosecutors' possession or control respecting the 
circumstances in which the informer may have previously testified for the Crown as 
an informer, including, at a minimum, the date, location and court where the 
previous testimony was given. (The police, in taking the informer's statement, 
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approach in death penalty cases involving jailhouse informants. 70 Of 
course, a savvy defense attorney could make a specific Brady request 
for all the information mentioned in Dodd, but why should the 
defendant with an inexperienced or incompetent attorney receive less 
information?71 
should inquire into any prior experiences testifYing for either the provincial or 
federal Crown as an informer or as a witness generally.). 
(3) Any offers or promises made by police, corrections authorities, Crown counsel, 
or a witness protection program to the informer or person associated with the 
informer in consideration for the information in the present case. 
(4) Any benefit given to the informer, members of the informer's family or any 
other person associated with the informer, or any benefits sought by such persons, as 
consideration for their co-operation with authorities, including but not limited to 
those kinds of benefits already listed in the Crown Policy Manual. 
(5) As noted earlier, any arrangements providing for a benefit (as set out above) 
should, absent exceptional circumstances, be reduced to writing and signed and/or be 
recorded on videotape. Such arrangements should be approved by a Director of 
Crown Operations or the In-Custody Informer Committee and disclosed to the 
defence prior to receiving the testimony of the witness (or earlier ... ). 
( 6) Copies of the notes of all police officers, corrections authorities or Crown 
counsel who made, or were present during, any promises of benefits to, any 
negotiations respecting benefits with, or any benefits sought by, an in custody 
informer. There may be additional notes of officers or corrections authorities which 
may also be relevant to the incustody informer's testimony at trial. 
(7) The circumstances under which the in-custody informer and his or her 
information came to the attention of the authorities. 
(8) If the informer will not be called as a Crown witness, a disclosure obligation still 
exists, subject to the informer's privilege. 
70 That statute makes the following information discoverable: 
(I) the complete criminal history of the informant; 
(2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the offering party has made or 
will make in the future to the informant; 
(3) the statements made by the accused; 
(4) the time and place of the statements, the time and place of their disclosure to law 
enforcement officials, and the names of ali persons who were present when the 
statements were made; 
(5) whether at any time the informant recanted that testimony or statement and, if 
so, the time and place of the recantation, the nature of the recantation, and the names 
of the persons who were present at the recantation; 
( 6) other cases in which the informant testified, provided that the existence of such 
testimony can be ascertained through reasonable inquiry and whether the informant 
received any promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for or subsequent to that 
testimony or statement; and, 
(7) any other information relevant to the informant's credibility. 
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.§ 5/ll5-2l(c) (West 2004). 
71 In Agurs, the Court wrote that failure to respond to a specific and relevant request "is 
seldom, if ever, excusable." 427 U.S. at 106. It added: "[l]fthe subject matter of such a request 
is material, or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable to 
require the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the 
problem to the trial judge." !d. 
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V. WRITTEN AGREEMENTS 
One of the most difficult areas to regulate involves unstated 
expectations and sub rosa understandings. 72 Recall Terri Holland's 
claim that she had received no benefit by testifying against Ron 
Williamson. One commentator has observed: 
To enhance the credibility of his testimony, an informant 
often testified that there have been no promises of benefits 
made to them in return for their testimony. Even though 
nothing may be explicitly stated, both the prosecutor and the 
informant knew that there will be some compensation for the 
testimony. "The practice (of promising rewards) was done by 
a wink and a nod and it was never necessary to have any kind 
offormal understanding."73 
As one court wrote: "We are not unaware of the reality that the 
Government has ways of indicating to witness's counsel the likely 
benefits from cooperation without making bald promises . "74 
Another court has highlighted the problem with this practice: 
By allowing Thornton to testify without making any express 
advance promises, the Commonwealth could presumably 
craft a reward post hoc that conformed to the quality of the 
service. This approach has the added advantage of permitting 
a prosecutor to tout the fact to the jury that no specific 
promises have been made to the witness. Needless to say, this 
tactic provides a witness who faces pending charges with an 
even stronger motive to lie than a witness with whom a 
bargain is made before trial. 75 
72 See R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope:" Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the 
Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1129, 1132 (2004) ("The Court's decision 
in Giglio has created an incentive for prosecutors to make representations to an accomplice 
witness that are vague and open-ended~ so that they will not be considered a firm 'promise' 
mandating disclosure .... Such indefinite agreements have the added advantage of allowing 
prosecutors to argue to the jury that no specific promise has been made to the witness; this is 
viewed as tactically more advantageous to the government because it prevents the factfinder 
from second-guessing the appropriateness of concessions ultimately conferred."). 
73 BLOOM, supra note 22, at 66 (citing L.A. Grand Jury Report, at 39, and Ted Rohrlich, 
Perjurer Sentenced to 3 Years; Crime: Informant Blew the Whistle on Use of Jailhouse Liar-for-
Hire, but No Law Officers Were Charged for Conspiring with Him, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1992, 
at Bl (quoting Douglas Dalton, special counsel to the Los Angeles County Grand Jury)). 
74 United States v. Ramirez, 608 F .2d 1261, 1266 n.9 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing United States 
v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1978), and adding "conceivably Zamora's and his 
counsel's protestations that the Government made no 'promises' while perhaps literally true 
might have been misleading"). 
75 Commonwealth v. Davis, 751 N.E.2d 420,423 n.7 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001). 
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Requiring written agreements of all deals is critical. The Kaufman 
Report recommended that, in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances, all agreements with in-custody informants be written 
and signed by the prosecutor, the informant, and defense counsel.76 
Oral agreements, if fully reproduced on videotape, may substitute for 
a written agreement. Written agreements are also the rule in federal 
practice. 77 
Of course, if the prosecutor claims there is no agreement, the 
problem remains. The federal comts have taken different approaches 
on how to deal with the problem of tacit agreements and Brady. 78 The 
Sixth Circuit recently addressed the problem but the panel decision 
was withdrawn for en bane review. 79 The panel wrote: 
While it is theoretically possible for the prosecution to grant a 
witness benefits after trial that have no com1ection to the 
witness' testimony, it is more than a fair assumption that the 
prosecution generally grants a witness such benefits in 
exchange for his testimony. The prosecution is also not in the 
business of altruism; it grants leniency to an informant 
because it wants that informant's testimony, and it wants to 
76 KAUFMAN REPORT, supra note 19, Recommendation 43. 
77 Cassidy, supra note 72, at 1147 ("Although not required by statute or rule of criminal 
procedure, almost all plea agreements with cooperating witnesses in federal court are put in 
writing.") (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION § 9-27-450 
(1993)). 
78 Compare Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Express or tacit, either 
way there would be an agreement, it would be usable for impeachment, and it would have to be 
disclosed to the defense."), and Reutter v. Solem, 888 F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Our 
conclusion does not depend on a fmding of either an express or an implied agreement between 
Trygstad and the prosecution regarding the prosecution's favorable recommendation to the 
parole board .... We hold that, viewed in the context of petitioner's trial, the fact of Trygstad's 
impending commutation hearing was material in the Bagley sense and that petitioner therefore is 
entitled to relief."), with Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[P]etitioner is 
correct that Landers and Pullum received a benefit because they testified against him. However, 
this fact, standing alone, does not establish that, prior to petitioner's trial, the District Attorney's 
Office promised Landers and Pullum leniency. The government is free to reward witnesses for 
their cooperation with favorable treatment in pending criminal cases without disclosing to the 
defendant its intention to do so, provided that it does not promise anything to the witnesses prior 
to their testimony."). 
79 See Bell v. Bell, 460 F.3d 739, 753-54 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[A] tacit agreement in this 
context is based on the transparent incentives for both the witness and the prosecution. The fact 
is that a jailhouse informant is one of the least likely candidates for altruistic behavior; his offer 
to testifY is almost always coupled with an expectation of some benefit in return. The 
prosecution is not naive as to this expectation, and the prosecution also knows that when the 
value of the informant's testimony reaches a sufficient level, it is in the prosecution's interest to 
fulfill this expectation. At the most fundamental level, the arrangement is a quid pro quo; the 
informant knows he is giving something of value and expects something in return; the 
prosecution knows it is receiving something of value, and gives something in return. No written 
or spoken word is required to understand the nature of this tacit agreement."), vacated, relz 'g 
granted en bane. 
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encourage other infonnants to come forward and testify. A 
rule requiring disclosure of a tacit agreement regardless of 
when the prosecution grants leniency recognizes this fact and 
is necessary to prevent the prosecution from shirking its 
Brady responsibilities by simply waiting until after the 
petitioner's trial to act on the tacit agreement. 80 
VI. OTHER APPROACHES 
609 
Several other approaches to the jailhouse snitch problem have been 
advocated. 
A. Prosecution Screening 
The first (and perhaps the most important) check on unreliable 
testimony by informants is the prosecutor.81 The Canadian 
("Kaufman") Commission in the Guy Paul Morin case provided a list 
of factors that prosecutors should review.82 
80 Id. at 755. 
81 See Steven M. Cohen, 1¥hat is Tnte? Perspectives of a Former Prosecutor, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 817, 827-28 (2002). 
82 Recommendation 41. [In assessing the reliability of in-custody informers, prosecutors 
should consider: 
(I) The extent to which the statement is confirmed ... ; 
(2) The specificity of the alleged statement. For example, a claim that the accused 
said "1 killed A.B." is easy to make but extremely difficult for any accused to 
disprove; 
(3) The extent to which the statement contains details or leads to the discove1y of 
evidence known only to the perpetrator; 
(4) The extent to which the statement contains details or leads which could 
reasonably be accessed by the in-custody informer, other than through inculpatory 
statements by the accused .... Crown counsel should be mindful that, historically, 
some informers have shown great ingenuity in securing information thought to be 
unaccessible to them. Furthermore, some informers have converted details 
communicated by the accused in the context of an exculpatory statement into details 
which purport to prove the making of an inculpatory statement; 
(5) The informer's general character, which may be evidenced by his or her 
criminal record or other disreputable or dishonest conduct known to the authorities; 
(6) Any request the informer has made for benefits or special treatment (whether or 
not agreed to) and any promises which may have been made (or discussed with the 
informer) by a person in authority in connection with the provision of the statement 
or an agreement to testify; 
(7) Whether the informer has, in the past, given reliable information to the 
authorities; 
(8) Whether the informer has previously claimed to have received statements while 
in custody. This may be relevant not only to the informer's reliability or unreliability 
but, more generally, to the issue of whether the public interest would be served by 
utilizing a recidivist informer who previously traded infmmation for benefits; 
(9) Whether the informer has previously testified in any court proceeding, whether 
as a witness for the prosecution or the defence or on his or her behalf, and any 
fmdings in relation to the accuracy and reliability of that evidence, if known; 
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Judge Trott has also provided step-by-step guidance for 
prosecutors. His fundamental message, however, is don't use 
jailhouse informants and, if you do, "Corroborate eve1ything you 
can." 83 
B. Corroboration Requirement 
Skepticism about the reliability of accomplice testimony has led 
many jurisdictions to require corroboration as a condition for a 
conviction. 84 A significant number mandate this requirement by 
statute. 85 The ABA recently adopted a resolution recommending that 
the corroboration rule be extended to jailhouse snitch testimony.86 
C. Jury Instructions 
Cautionary jury instructions are another possibility. Such 
instructions are often used with accomplice testimony. 87 There Is, 
(I 0) Whether the informer made some written or other record of the words allegedly 
spoken by the accused and, if so, whether the record was made contemporaneous to 
the alleged statement of the accused; 
(ll)The circumstances under which the informer's report of the alleged statement 
was taken (e.g. report made immediately after the statement was made, report made 
to more than one officer, etc); 
(12)The manner in which the report of the statement was taken by the police (e.g. 
through use of non-leading questions, through report of words spoken by the 
accused, through investigation of circumstances which might suggest opportunity or 
lack of opportunity to fabricate a statement) .... ; 
(13)Any other known evidence that may attest to or diminish the credibility of the 
informer, including the presence or absence of any relationship between the accused 
and the informer; 
(14) Any relevant information contained in any available registry of informers. 
KAUFMAN REPORT, supra note 19, Recommendation No. 39 ("Confirmation should be defined 
as credible evidence or information, available to the Crown, independent of the in-custody 
informer, which significantly supports the position that the inculpatory aspects of the proposed 
evidence were not fabricated. One in-custody informer does not provide confrrmation for 
another."). 
83 Trott, supra note 1, at 1427. 
84 See, e.g., Humber v. State, 466 So. 2d 165 (Ala. Crirn. App. 1985) (citing statute); State 
v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001) ("In Tennessee, a conviction may not be based 
solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice."). 
85 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.020 (Michie 2004); ARK.. CODE ANN. § 16-89-ll!E 
(Michie 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § Ill (Deering 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-8 (2003); 
NEV. REV. STAT.§ 175.291 (2004); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.22 (Consol. 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
22 § 742 (2004); OR. REv. STAT. § 136.440 (2003). Eighteen states require corroboration of an 
accomplice's testimony. 
86 INNOCENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 63. 
87 In Banks v. Dretke, Justice Ginsburg, speaking for seven Justices, observed: 
The jury, moreover, did not benefit from customary, truth-promoting precautions that 
generally accompany the testimony of informants. This Court has long recognized 
the "serious questions of credibility" informers pose. On Lee v. United States, 343 
U.S. 747, 757 (1952). See also Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using 
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however, great variability regarding special jury instructions. 88 In 
some jurisdictions, a cautionary instruction is not required where 
there is corroboration of accomplice testimony. For example, in 
Virginia, in the absence of corroboration, it is the duty of the court to 
give a cautionary instruction. 89 In Mississippi, cautionary instructions 
are discretionary, but that discretion can be abused where the state's 
evidence rests solely on accomplice testimony and there is some 
question as to the reasonableness and consistency of that testimony.90 
In Utah, giving a cautionary instruction generally falls within the 
discretion of the court, but it must be given if the judge fmds the 
testimony "self-contradictory, uncertain or improbable."91 Federal 
cases set forth various versions of such instructions, some using the 
language "particular caution" and others employing phrases such as 
"great caution" or "great caution and care."92 
Special cautionary instructions should be given whenever there is 
accomplice or informant testimony, whether corroborated or not and 
regardless of other factors. 93 Here, again, Dodd v. State is the 
Criminals as Witnesses, 47 Hastings L. J. 1381, 1385 (1996) ("Jurors suspect 
[informants'] motives from the moment they hear about them in a case, and they 
frequently disregard their testimony altogether as highly untrustworthy and 
unreliable .... "). We have therefore allowed defendants "broad latitude to probe 
[informants'] credibility by cross-examination" and have counseled submission of 
the credibility issue to the jury "with careful instructions." On Lee, 343 U.S. at 757; 
accord, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311-312 (1966). See also lA K. 
O'Malley, J. Grenig, & W. Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal § 
15.02 (5th ed. 2000) (jury instructions from the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits on special caution appropriate in assessing informant 
testimony). 
540 U.S. 668,701-02 (2004). 
88 See State v. May, 339 So. 2d 764, 775 (La. 1976) ("As a general principle of Louisiana 
law, a conviction can be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of a purported accomplice, 
although the jury should be instructed to treat such testimony with great caution."). 
89 See Smith v. Commonwealth, 237 S.E.2d 776, 777 (Va. 1977) ("[T]he accomplice's 
testimony was not sufficiently corroborated, and it was error to refuse a cautionary 
instruction."). 
90 See Slaughterv. State, 815 So. 2d 1122, 1134 (Miss. 2002). 
91 UTAH CODE ANN.§ 77-17-7 (2004). 
92 See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 244 F.3d 784, 789 (lOth Cir. 200!) ("weighed with 
great care, and received with caution"); United States v. Prawl, 168 F.3d 622, 629 (2d Cir. 
1999) ("weighed by you with great care"); United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, !53 
(5th Cir. 1998) ("greater caution than other testimony"); United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 
1522, 1538 (9th Cir. 1988) ("great caution and care"). 
93 Research indicates that the timing of the instruction is important-i.e., instructions 
close in time to the admission of the evidence are more effective. See SAUL M. KASSIN & 
LAWRENCE S. WRJGHTSMAN, THE AMERlCAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
145 (1988) ("These data demonstrate that adherence to judges' instructions might hinge on their 
placement within the trial. 'Better late than never' may apply to some areas of life, but not to the 
practice of instructing juries."). See also Amiram Elwork & Bruce D. Sales, Jury Instructions, in 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 280, 291 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence 
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landmark case. The court required a jury instruction specific to 
jailhouse informants. 94 
D. Expert Testimony 
Sometimes courts have allowed expert testimony to enlighten 
jurors about police procedures that may generate suspect evidence. 
Eyewitness identifications95 and false confessions are examples.96 In 
State v. DuBray,97 the Montana Supreme Court ruled that the trial 
court had not abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony 
regarding the credibility of incarcerated informants. The trial court 
had precluded the testimony because (1) it would have invaded the 
province of the jury, (2) it was mmecessary because the notion of 
ptisoners bartering testimony in exchange for favorable treatment is 
generally understood by lay persons, and (3) the accused had the 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses regarding their possible 
motivations. 98 As noted above, however, cross-examination will only 
be effective if counsel has all the pertinent information concerning 
any cooperation agreement, which is often not the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Brady often fails because the Supreme Court undercut the 
prosecutor's obligation by adding a stringent materiality requirement, 
which an accused must satisfy to establish a due process violation. 
S. Wrightsman eds., 1985) ("Although there is no empirical data on this, it is logical to assume 
that such instructions [limited purpose] are properly timed. That is, these instructions are 
probably most effective when they are presented in the immediate context of the evidence or 
procedures to which they apply."). 
94 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crirn. App. 2000): 
The testimony of an informer who provides evidence against a defendant must be 
examined and weighed by you with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary 
witoess. Whether the informer's testimony has been affected by interest or prejudice 
against the defendant is for you to determine. In making that determination, you 
should consider: (l) whether the witoess has received anything (including pay, 
immunity from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, personal advantage, or 
vindication) in exchange for testimony; (2) any other case in which the informant 
testified or offered statements against an individual but was not called, and whether 
the statements were admitted in the case, and whether the informant received any 
deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for that testimony or statement; (3) 
whether the informant has ever changed his or her testimony; ( 4) the criminal history 
of the informant; and (5) any other evidence relevant to the informer's credibility. 
95 See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD 1. IMwlNKELREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE§ 9-2 
(4th ed. 2007) (discussing cases). 
96 Id, § 9-9 (discussing cases). 
97 77 P.3d 247 (Mont. 2003). 
98 !d. at 256. 
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Given this doctrinal banier, a better approach focuses on an expanded 
discovery rule along the lines set forth by the court in Dodd 
